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Abstract
Recent empirical evidence seems to show that temporary migration is a widespread phenomenon, espe-
cially among highly skilled workers who return to their countries of origin when these begin to grow. This
paper develops a simple, tractable overlapping generations model that provides a rationale for return migra-
tion and predicts who will migrate and who returns among agents with heterogeneous abilities. The model
also incorporates the interaction between the migration decision and schooling: the possibility of migrating,
albeit temporarily, to a country with high returns to skills produces positive schooling incentive eects.
We use parameter values from the literature and data on return migration to simulate the model for the
Eastern-Western European case. We then quantify the eects that increased openness (to migrants) would
have on human capital and wages in Eastern Europe. We nd that, for plausible values of the parameters,
the possibility of return migration combined with the education incentive channel reverses the brain drain
into a signicant brain gain for Eastern Europe.
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11 Introduction
In the post-1990 period Eastern Europe experienced signicant migration ows of its highly educated workers
to Western Europe. A non-trivial share of those migrants, however, subsequently returned to their country of
origin, most likely with enhanced skills and abilities. Has this phenomenon of migration and (partial) return
decreased or increased the average human capital of Eastern Europe? And if mobility between East and West
becomes even freer in the next decade, will this produce a brain-drain or a brain-gain for Eastern Europe?
The present article provides a theoretical model to think about the decision of migration and return and its
interaction with the choice of schooling. We then use this model together with parameters from the literature
to obtain quantitative simulations of the eect of increased openness (between Eastern and Western Europe)
on the average human capital and wages in Eastern Europe. The model's goal is to illustrate the decisions with
respect to education, migration, and return of optimizing individuals and to quantify the impact of increased
migration possibilities on the individual decisions and on the aggregate schooling and wages of the country of
origin of migrants.
Recently, the debate regarding the consequences of the brain drain has intensied1. Some researchers have
taken very strong stands in denouncing the costs of brain drain (especially in the medical eld and especially for
very poor countries2) but other recent articles (Beine et al. 2001; Batista et al. 2007; Docquier and Rapoport
2008) based on extensive empirical data on highly educated migrants point to evidence of a positive "schooling
incentive" eect from skilled migration. If the possibility of migration increases incentives for schooling, some of
the more educated workers may end up staying, and this would result in an increase in the human capital of the
sending country. Our paper adds a second mechanism to the analysis of brain drain and brain gain: the return
migration of highly educated workers. We will review the literature that shows that return migration is not a
marginal phenomenon but is of interest for as much as one fourth to one third of migrants. Two questions then
arise: Why do the highly educated return? And does temporary migration combined with the education incentive
mechanism leave the sending country better o as a result of increased international mobility? Moreover, in the
presence of selective migration, who would be most likely to leave? And who would be most likely to return?
This paper advances the literature by providing a framework and some numerical simulations to think about
these questions, and it quanties these eects for the case of Eastern-Western European migration.
In particular, we develop a simple overlapping generations model of a small open economy in which optimizing
agents decide (in sequence) on the level of education to acquire, whether to migrate or not and, if they do migrate,
whether to return or not. By calibrating some key parameters to the wage dierentials, education returns and
1Early contributions arguing for a negative impact of brain drain on developing countries are Gruber and Scott (1966), Bhagwati
(1976), Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), Bhagwati and Rodriguez (1975).
2Remarkable for its extreme thesis and for the very inuential outlet where it appeared was an article in the February 23, 2008
issue of "The Lancet" a leading medical journal entitled: "Should active recruitment of health workers from sub-Saharan Africa be
viewed as a crime?"
2migration and return ows between Eastern-Western Europe we analyze the impact of increased international
mobility on the average human capital (and wages) in the countries of origin. Following the recent brain-drain
literature we summarize the international mobility (from the poor country) with a probability of emigrating,
for people who would like to do so. Such uncertainty captures the fact that due to restrictions, immigration
regulations and quotas people who choose to migrate and thereby select themselves into the "pool" of potential
emigrants often do not succeed in migrating. Besides the choices of education and migration we also analyze the
choice of whether or not to return. This introduces another potential margin of choice and, as we will show, the
positive or negative selection of return migrants and their eect on the average human capital of the sending
country depends on the "return premium", namely the wage premium to skills acquired abroad.
We nd that the possibility of temporary migration to a country with high returns to schooling produces
most of the same positive incentive eects as the possibility of permanent migration. First, the individuals
who plan to migrate and return invest more in schooling since their return to schooling, while abroad and also
after returning, are higher. This eect is similar to the "incentive" eect emphasized by Mountford (1997) and
Beine et al. (2001): one does not need permanent migration to have positive incentive eects for schooling. In
particular, if there is a wage-productivity premium for returnees, for example because of entrepreneurial abilities
and skills acquired abroad, migration and return stimulate education. Second, the selection of returnees among
emigrants depends crucially on whether the wage premium upon return increases with the education level of
migrants or not. We show that if all returnees receive the same skill premium (for having been abroad), then
returnees will be negatively selected. However, since they come from the positively selected pool of migrants
the returnees will still have an intermediate level of education. In contrast, if the premium to skills upon return
increases with the level of education then only the most educated among emigrants return and this provides
a further boost to the average education of the sending country on top of the education incentive eect. We
simulate our model using parameter values and data which mirror the dierences between Eastern European
and Western European economies. We nd that it is plausible to expect a positive eect on the average human
capital of Eastern European countries when migration policies become more open in the West, even when return
migrants are selected from the less educated of the emigrants.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical literature on brain drain, brain
gain and brain return and presents the existing evidence on the size of return migration and estimates of the
wage premium upon return. Section 3 develops and solves a simple overlapping generations model in which
workers in a poor country choose their level of education, choose whether or not to migrate, and choose whether
or not to return. The model provides several insights as to the key determinants of each decision in a country
with no prospective emigration and in a country with an increasing possibility of emigration. Section 4 uses
parameters from the literature to simulate the impact of looser emigration policies on human capital and wages
3in the sending country; we also consider the eect of dierent assumptions about the return premium, drawing
from the existing literature, and of more sophisticated policies in which the probability of emigrating depends
on the level of education. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2 Literature Review and Empirical Evidence on Return
There is a substantial number of theoretical papers dealing with the education incentive eects of migration,
some of which also consider the option of return migration. An early contribution by Mountford (1997) empha-
sized the positive schooling eects of introducing a positive probability of migration. In this seminal contribution
the possibility of temporary migration was also mentioned as an alternative to permanent migration for pro-
ducing positive schooling incentives. At least in theory, access to international labor markets, where returns to
human capital are higher than domestic returns, may induce people in less developed countries to pursue higher
education. Such an incentive mechanism, combined with the uncertainty of migration (due to immigration laws
and procedures), may result in greater acquisition of education by people who end up staying in the country.
Chau and Stark (1999) added the possibility of asymmetric information with respect to workers' quality and
showed that migration would be followed by the return of migrants at both ends of the skill spectrum, which
could be welfare enhancing for the country of origin. Stark et al. (1997, 1998) also analyzed migration, hu-
man capital formation and return. Each of these was a purely theoretical paper.3 Recent empirical papers by
Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001), and Docquier and Rapoport (2008) used data assembled by Docquier
and Marfouk (2006) to test empirically whether the education incentive eect is only a theoretical curiosum
or has empirical relevance. While there seems to be some evidence of the eect at work, the combined net
eect of brain drain and brain gain seems positive only in countries with low emigration rates. Our model
contributes to this literature by introducing a framework in which the interaction between returns to skills,
migration and return can be studied in an overlapping generations model with probabilistic migration. The
model is analytically tractable and solvable (at the cost of specifying some functional forms). At the same
time the model can be parameterized and simulated. This allows us to quantify the positive eect on human
capital (and wages) of the possibility of migration. Moreover, we can empirically analyze the importance of
schooling incentives and return migration separately by simulating a "counter-factual" scenario in which no
return or no schooling eect is allowed. In this way, we produce quantitative simulations of the brain gain and
the brain return eect. Ultimately, rather than derive general qualitative results, we want to apply the model to
the Eastern-Western European case, using parameters for these countries to simulate reasonable, quantitative
eects and to understand the channel through which they operate.
3More recent theoretical contributions in this vein are: Stark and Wang (2002) and Schi (2005). Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay
(2003) emphasize the benecial eect of returnees by suggesting that they promote knowledge diusion to the sending country.
4An important empirical magnitude that we want to match with our model is the overall size of the return
migration as a share of migrants. While it is hard to measure from receiving country statistics, several studies
have quantied the share of migrants who eventually return to their country of origin as ranging between 25
and 40%. Lalonde and Topel (1993) found that about one third of immigrants to the US between 1890 and 1957
returned home, and Dustmann and Weiss (2007) nd that up to 50% of immigrants to the UK between 1992
and 2002 left the country within 10 years of their arrival. A survey held by INSEE (1995) in France found that
25% of the guest workers intend to go back home and that the percentage is 30% among highly skilled. The
International Migration Outlook (OECD 2008) shows that 25 to 50% of all immigrants to a European country
had re-migrated elsewhere (most likely back to their country of origin) after 5 years. These measures emphasize
that return migration is a sizeable phenomenon and should be accounted for in any quantitative assessment of
the eects of migrations.
Our model shows that a key parameter in determining the selection of return migrants and their level of
schooling is the wage "premium" that they obtain upon return, relative to workers with similar characteristics
who never migrated. We call this the "return premium". Such a premium determines the share of emigrants who
return as well as their selection. In particular, if the premium is mainly seen as a reward to the "entrepreneurial"
capital developed abroad due to the connections and interactions established, we can think of it as independent
of the level of education. This would be in line with several recent case studies which emphasize that returnees
have been important sources of entrepreneurship (Constant and Massey 2002, McCormick and Wahba, 2004),
particularly for start-ups in high tech sectors in countries such as India (Commander, Chanda and Kangasiemi,
2004) and in the Hsinchu Science Park in Taipei (Luo and Wang 2004). On the other hand, one can think of the
return to entrepreneurial and other abilities upon return as being particularly high for the most highly educated.
Zucker and Darby (2007) nd that in the period 1981-2004 there was a strong tendency of "star scientists" in
several science and technology elds in the US to return to their country of origin, at least for some period, to
promote the start-up of high tech rms (especially in China, Taiwan and Brazil). Dustmann and Weiss (2007)
use UK data to show that the tendency of migrants to return to their country of origin is much stronger among
workers in highly skilled occupations (their Table 2) and that the migrants' return occurs mostly within ten
years of their arrival (their Figure 3). Similarly, Gundel and Peters (2008) using data on migrants to Germany
show a much higher return rate for the highly educated compared with the less educated.
Considering evidence on the wage-premium to return migrants from European countries, Barrett and
O'Connell (2001) show a 10-15% premium for return migrants to Ireland relative to similar workers who did not
migrate, and Iara (2008) nds a 25-30% premium for workers in Eastern Europe who have had experience in
Western Europe. Both studies nd very strong and signicant evidence of the premium, however the rst study
does not nd that the premium is associated with schooling, while the second one does. All in all, we think
5that the existing literature provides very robust evidence of substantial return migration and of a signicant
wage premium to returnees. The evidence on the selection of return migrants and on the dependence of the
return premium on migrants' schooling is more mixed. In our model we rst consider a baseline scenario which
produces negatively selected return migrants and a return premium that is independent of schooling (conserva-
tive case), and we then extend the model to a case generating positive selection with a return premium that is
increasing with schooling.
3 The Model
The goal of this section is to present a simple model that allows us to discuss the eects of potential migration
and return on the average human capital (and average wages) of people remaining in the sending country. While
the model has a simple 2-period overlapping generations structure, it allows us to discuss the key incentives
to migrate and to return in connection with human capital accumulation. One advantage of the model is that
it can easily be parameterized and simulated using estimates from the literature and summary statistics for
Eastern and Western Europe. The key insight provided by the simulations is a quantication of the eects
that dierent degrees of openness have on the average education of people left in the sending country and the
role of return migration in determining this outcome. We describe the intuition, the basic assumptions and the
main results of the model in the present section 3 and we leave to the Appendix the more lengthy mathematical
derivations.
3.1 Production and Wages
Consider the Home country economy (indicated with an H) as the poorer economy whose individuals may
decide to emigrate. In Home there are heterogeneous workers (indexed by i ) who produce one non-durable
good Y according to the following aggregate production function:
Y = AHLH (1)
where AH indicates total factor productivity (TFP), LH equals total employment and  denes the average
human capital in the economy. Each individual i supplies one unit of labor and i units of human capital -
specic to individual i - so that the average human capital  is equal to 1
LH
PLH
1 i: As is customary in the
"Mincerian" approach to human capital, we assume that the human capital of each individual is an exponential
function of her schooling, hi, so that i = eHhi where H represents the returns to schooling in the home
country. The production function exhibits constant returns to scale in total labor (and omits physical capital)
6so that it can be thought of as a long-run production function in which capital adjusts to keep the capital-output
ratio constant and the productivity of a worker is determined by TFP and by her level of human capital. In
fact, the marginal productivity (and wage) in the Home country of worker i in logarithmic terms is given by:
ln(w1
Hi) = ln(AH) + Hhi (2)
To simplify the consumption side of the model we assume that there are no nancial markets so that in
each period people use all their wage income purchasing good Y . Moreover, we assume that the agent's utility
function is separable over time and logarithmic in each period so that expression (2) also represents the period
utility from working and living at Home. We assume a production function in the Foreign country (F) similar
to (1) with country-specic total factor productivity, AF; and country-specic returns to schooling, F. At the
same time we assume that there are costs of living abroad for a migrant (material as well as psychological) and
that those costs are specic to the period of the individual's life. We express these costs in utility units and
denote them by M1 and M2 where the subscripts refer to the period in which they are incurred. In general,
we consider as relevant the case in which M1 is large enough so that not all workers from Home move to the
Foreign country in the rst period. Also we assume M2  M1; as the costs of living abroad are not likely
to increase from the rst to the second period following migration (adjustment to the new country, including
integration and adoption of local customs, will likely make it less costly to live abroad).4 Hence the utility
abroad (logarithmic wage net of costs of living abroad) for individual i when young is:
ln(w1
Fi)   M1 = ln(AF) + Fhi   M1 (3)
If the individual chooses to remain abroad in the second period, she will receive the following utility (loga-
rithmic wage net of costs of living abroad):
ln(w2
Fi)   M2 = ln(AF) + Fhi   M2 (4)
Since we are considering Home as the relatively poor country we assume that ln(AH) < ln(AF) so that part of
the wage dierential between countries is due to dierent productivity levels (in favor of F): Moreover, following
the literature on "appropriate technological choice" and skill-biased technological progress (e.g. Acemoglu 2002,
Caselli and Coleman 2006), we assume that the returns to schooling are higher in Foreign than at Home because
a larger share of highly educated workers in that country induces the adoption of technologies that use human
capital more eciently. Hence we adopt this assumption (H < F), which is empirically true in the comparison
between Eastern and Western Europe (see section 4 below) and we maintain it as a restriction for the parameters
4The formal conditions under which these restrictions hold are stated in section 4.1.
7in our analysis.5
In analyzing the return decision we assume that Home workers who have been abroad for one period have
"enhanced" their human capital by learning new skills, abilities and techniques. If they decide to return, this
increases their earnings (as a result of the augmentation of their human capital). This extra benet, however,
would not be reaped if they stayed in Foreign where they would simply have the same returns in the second
period as they did in the rst6. This assumption is justied by evidence that highly-skilled returnees to middle-
income countries often engage in entrepreneurial activities and act as skilled entrepreneurs7 earning an additional
premium on their skills. Moreover, some middle-income countries, especially those that are rapidly climbing
the development ladder, place a premium on highly skilled workers who have had experience abroad. A simple
way to capture this "wage premium" for returnees is to write the (logarithmic) wage of a person who returns
to the home country in the second period of her life after having been abroad as:
ln(w2
FHi) = ln(AH) + Hhi +  (5)
where w2
FH indicates the wage in the second period of life (superscript) for individual j who has been abroad
and returned home. The parameter  > 0 is a scaling factor for human capital associated with the experience
abroad. Expression (5) assumes that the "return premium" is additive in logs and hence proportionally constant
for any worker, independent of her level of human capital. Some empirical evidence presented in section 2 above,
however, is consistent with the assumption that more educated workers receive a higher premium on their return,
since their skills may be enhanced by the foreign experience. That assumption would imply the presence of
a term hi (rather than ) in (5). Since the implications of a return premium which increases with skill is
interesting, we will explore it in the extension presented in section 4.3.1.
To complete the description of the utility of individuals in all potential periods and cases, the utility of
workers who stayed at home is the same in the second period as in the rst period and is given by the following
expression: ln(w2
Hi) = ln(AH) + Hhi.
5This assumption is important in order to obtain migration from poorer to richer countries and positive selection of migrants,
which is empirically documented, for example, in Grogger and Hanson (2008).
6We could also include some gross return to experience that accrues to the worker and increases her human capital whether or
not she remains abroad. Obviously, this would not aect the comparison between wages abroad and at home in the second period
and hence would not have any eect on the decision to stay or return.
7For instance, Luo and Wang (2002) show that in the Hsinchu Science Park in Taipei a large share of companies was started
and run by returnees. McCormick and Wahba (2001) show a high probability that literate returnees will invest their own savings
and become entrepreneurs. Commander, Chanda and Winters (2008) nd that Indian IT rms in 2000 reported that a large share
of their most skilled workers had international experience. Finally Zucker and Darby (2007) show that many international star
scientists in the eld of biotechnologies in the 1980-2000 period (a key period for high-tech startups) returned from the U.S. to
their country of origin, ultimately having a very positive eect on their origin country. China, Taiwan and Brazil seem to be net
receivers of these star scientists over that period.
83.2 Migration and Return
At the beginning of the rst period (young) individual i chooses how much schooling to get, hi; and simultane-
ously pays the cost, ki, for this education. Immediately afterwards (still at the beginning of period 1) she also
chooses whether to be considered as a candidate for migration. We treat migration as a lottery. It is a voluntary
decision whether to participate in the lottery or not. Once an individual has entered the lottery she faces the
same probability of migrating as any other participant. 8 We index the decision to enter the lottery with the
indicator variable li, which takes a value of 0 if the individual does not participate and 1 if she does. Once the
education and lottery decisions are resolved, the individual participates in production and earns the wage in
the home country (if she stayed out of the lottery or entered but was not selected to migrate) or abroad if she
entered the lottery and was selected as a migrant. The probability of being selected as a migrant is p 2 [0;1]:
At the beginning of the second period people who remain at Home continue to earn wage wHi (we assume that
the cost of moving in the second period is too high to make it protable or that the receiving country has a
policy which signicantly penalizes the immigration of older workers), while emigrants living abroad can decide
whether to stay in Foreign or to return. We index their decision to return with the indicator variable qi, which
takes a value of 0 if the person stays abroad and of 1 if she returns.
The only uncertainty in the model is given by the uncertain migration prospects for workers who enter
the migration lottery. Other than that, workers know their salary at Home and in Foreign and for simplicity
we assume that productivity and returns to schooling do not change (steady state assumption). The optimal
decisions of an individual can be obtained by starting with her last period and proceeding backwards. If the
individual remains at Home during her rst period, her utility in the second period is ln(wHi) and no decision
is needed; if she migrated in the rst period she has to decide whether to return (qi = 1) or not (qi = 0); and
such a choice depends on whether the utility of living abroad net of the costs, ln(w2
Fi) M2; is larger or smaller
than the utility from returning ln(w2
FHi). Substituting expressions (4) and (5) into the inequality one easily
obtains the optimal choice q





1 if hi <
M2+ (ln(AF) ln(AH))
F H




The larger the return premium  and the cost of living abroad M2; the larger is the group of returnees: only
workers with high hi would remain abroad during the second period to reap the larger education premium (due
to the dierence F   H > 0). Plugging in the optimal return decision (6) we can now solve the rst period
inter-temporal optimization with respect to the decision to enter the lottery (li) and the amount of human
8The uncertainty from the migration decision stems from quotas, restrictions and rules imposed by the immigration policy of
receiving countries. In section 4.3 below we analyze the case in which the lottery does not assign equal probability to all applicants
but discriminates according to either their observed education or the period of stay (permanent versus temporary).
9capital to acquire. The lifetime expected utility of agent i is:
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1+ is the inter-temporal discount factor and the variable q
i denotes the optimal return decision.
The individual utility cost of acquiring human capital is denoted by ki which we assume depends on the innate
abilities of individual i; i, which is distributed over an interval [;]. As in models of signaling9, we assume







where  is an exogenous shifter of schooling costs. Since the decision to enter the immigration lottery is















































The denominator of the right hand side expression (F   H)(2 +    q
i ) is always positive. Hence, only
workers with human capital above a certain threshold would enter the lottery, since they would prot from
migration. Notice that the probability of "winning the migration lottery" p does not aect the threshold level
of human capital which determines the decision to enter the lottery. The reason is simple: workers with human
capital above the threshold are those whose utility, net of costs, increases by migrating. Hence, they would take
any probability of migrating over the certainty of staying. Those who do not participate (with human capital
below the threshold) are better o not migrating.
The two functions (6) and (10) dene two thresholds for the education level h. One that we call hS denes
the lowest educational level for which it is benecial to emigrate and the other hMM denes the lowest human
9See for instance Spence (1974) and Stiglitz (1975).
10capital level for which it is benecial to migrate and not return in the second period. Temporary migration
exists only if hS < hMM, in which case some workers migrate and return and others stay abroad. If hS > hMM;
all migrants (still selected among the highly educated) are permanent (i.e. they do not return in the second
period).
Putting together conditions (6) and (10) and assuming that hS < hMM (which is the relevant case if the
current model is to explain the empirically observed return migration) we can partition the range of schooling
levels of workers into three intervals. For a level of schooling below the following threshold:
hi <
M1(1 + ) + M2(1   qi)   qi   (ln(AF)   ln(AH))(2 +    qi)
(F   H)(2 +    qi)
 hS (11)
workers choose to stay at Home (hence l
i = 0, q
i = 0) in both periods. For human capital between the
values:
M1(1 + ) + M2(1   qi)   qi   (ln(AF)   ln(AH))(2 +    qi)
(F   H)(2 +    qi)
< hi <
M2 +    (ln(AF)   ln(AH))
F   H
(12)
workers choose to enter the migration lottery and, conditional on emigrating, they return in the second
period (l
i = 1, q
i = 1), while if they lose the lottery they will stay in the Home country in both periods.
Finally, for values of human capital larger than the threshold hMM (MM for permanent migration) dened in
(13) workers choose to enter the lottery and, conditional on emigrating, they stay abroad in their second period
of life (l
i = 1, q
i = 0).
hi >
M2 +    (ln(AF)   ln(AH))
F   H
 hMM (13)
Notice that such a model (with the parameter restriction imposed above) produces positive skill selection
of emigrants (as documented in Grogger and Hanson, 2008) and negative skill selection of returnees among
migrants (as argued and documented in Borjas and Bratsberg, 1986).10
3.3 The Schooling Decision
Dierentiating (7) with respect to human capital hi, and keeping in mind that q
i and l
i are equal to either 0 or
1 so that we only need to keep track of the thresholds hS and hMM, optimal schooling is given by the following





ip(F   H))   1
1+lipq
i (F   H)
2
i (14)
10Notice that a return premium that is positively related to schooling would generate a positive selection of returnees among
emigrants, as we describe in section 4.3.1.
11The relationship between ability and optimal schooling depends on the subsequent optimal choice of whether
to participate in the migration lottery and whether to return. Those choices in turn depend on the values of hi
relative to the thresholds: The easiest way to analyze the optimal choice of schooling and migration as a function
of i is to consider the three dierent migration choices (no migration, migration and return and permanent







































i = 1 (permanent migration)
where the notations hS
i , hMR
i ; hMM
i indicate, respectively, the optimal amount of schooling for people
who stay at Home (S), for people who migrate and return (MR) and for people who migrate permanently
(MM). It is clear from inspection of the coecients of the linear relationships in (15) that they go from
smallest (S) to largest (MM). The optimal functions in (15) together with the threshold values (11) and (13)
determine the correspondence between individual ability i; and the schooling and migration decisions. Figure
1 illustrates the relationship between i and h
i and reports the threshold values (11) and (13) determining
migration behavior. The gure shows that workers of ability lower than S, formally given by expression (16)
below, choose to acquire relatively little education and not enter the immigration lottery (l







M1(1 + ) + M2   (ln(AF)   ln(AH))(2 + )
(F   H)(2 + )
(16)
For ability levels between S and MM (dened in equation (17) below) workers choose to acquire an
intermediate level of education, enter the lottery for emigration and, conditionally on migrating, return in the
second period (l
i = 1, q






M2 +    (ln(AF)   ln(AH))
F   H
(17)
Finally, for ability levels greater than MM workers enter the migration lottery and stay abroad in the second
period. The three bold segments in Figure 1 represent the schooling levels of the three groups of workers: those
who stay, returning migrants and permanent migrants. Those with low ability (below S) get little education
and do not even attempt to migrate. Those with intermediate ability (between S and MM) attempt to migrate
and if they succeed (with probability p) they return in the second period. Those with high ability (above MM)
attempt to migrate and, if they succeed, stay abroad in the second period. These features are consequences of
12the key assumption that F > H. While within the range of parameters taken from the literature and explored
in section 4 the ability threshold for migrating, S; is always below the ability threshold, MM, it is in principle
possible that MM  S. In this case, there would be no return migration. This case is illustrated in Figure 2:
workers with ability below S = MM stay at home while those with ability higher than MM migrate in the
rst period and stay abroad in the second period. Because all empirical studies suggest that return migration
is sizeable and signicant, we regard the second case as unlikely and focus on the relevant case in which there
are returnees as well as permanent migrants.
Before proceeding further we want to emphasize the role of p, the probability of migrating, in aecting the
schooling of each group. An increase in p in our model has two eects. First, it increases the slope of hMR
i and
therefore decreases the value of the threshold S; and second it increases the slope of hMM
i and hence decreases
the threshold MM. This implies that a larger range of workers (those with abilities between S and ) will
get more schooling than before { this is the incentive eect already pointed out in the literature by Mountford
(1997), Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997, 1998) and Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001). However,
people in this group will also have a higher probability of leaving { this is the classic brain drain eect. Since
the group of returnees lies between S and MM and both thresholds shift to the left, their share in the total
does not change much, but the education acquired for each level of  increases. Hence, in a model in which there
are prospects of migration, be they temporary (with return) or permanent, a higher probability of success in
migrating increases the incentives to acquire education for both types, and hence the "brain gain" mechanism
extends to both types of migrants.
The simple model presented above allows us to solve for the average level of human capital of workers in
the Home country. Given the simple (logarithmic) wage equations in (2)-(5), once we know the human capital
level for an individual or a group we can easily compute their logarithmic wage. To make the model operational
and to derive expressions for average schooling and wages, we assume that the distribution of abilities  2 [0;]
is uniform with density 1=: Moreover, the Home country population consists of two generations: the young
(denoted with the subscript 1) and the old (denoted with the subscript 2). The pre-migration size of each
generation at time t is denoted by 1t and 2t (for the young and the old, respectively) and the post-migration
size, which is relevant in order to compute average human capital (and average wages), is given by 1t(1 m1t)
and 2t(1   m2t), respectively, where m1t and m2t are the shares of young and old living abroad. Therefore,
the average human capital in the Home country in period t; ht, is given by the following expression:
ht =
1t(1   m1t)h1t + 2t(1   m2t)h2t:
1t(1   m1t) + 2t(1   m2t)
(18)
where h1t and h2t are the average levels of schooling of young and old people living at Home. The young
are those who did not emigrate (either by choice or because they did not win the lottery) while the old are a
13mixture of those who remained and those who returned. In the next section we express the dependence of h1t
and h2t on the parameters of the model and, in particular, we analyze their dependence on the probability of
migrating.
3.4 Average Human Capital and Wages
If there is no possibility of emigration (p = 0), returns to education are equal to H and everybody in the source
country chooses the level of education identied by hS
i (i) in (15). The average human capital in autarky













Now consider the case with positive probability of migration, 0 < p < 1. Some workers, depending on their
ability, have an incentive to invest more in schooling and take a chance at emigrating (possibly with return).
The average human capital of young individuals who remain in the Home country depends on the average
human capital of three groups, represented by the three red segments in Figure 1. Considering the relevant
case, S < MM
11, there will be a group of least educated who do not enter the lottery for migrating and pursue
the lowest possible level of education per their ability. A second group gets an intermediate level of education
and enters the lottery (with the prospect of migrating and returning) but is not selected to migrate, and a
third group gets the highest education (with the prospect of migrating and staying abroad) but is not selected
either. Expression (20) below shows the average human capital of the young generation as a weighted average
of mean human capital in each of these three groups. The weights are the share of that group in the total
young population (after migration) and the averages, because of the uniform distribution assumption, are the











(1   p)(MM   S)





hMM( ) + hMM(MM)

(1   p)(    MM)
S + (1   p)(   S)
The rst term on the right hand side of (20) is the product of the average human capital of individuals
who prefer staying at Home (and hence do not participate in the lottery), given by 1
2hS(S), and their share
in the total non-migrating young population, given by S
S+(1 p)( S)
12: The second term contains the aver-
age human capital of workers who get a higher education, are planning to migrate and return, but are not





, times their share in the non-migrating, young popula-
11Appendix A shows the value of average human capital when S > MM.
12Because of the uniform distribution of abilities, the share can be expressed as the simple ratio of the support of  for the group
and the total support, accounting for the fact that in the interval [s;  ] only a fraction (1   p) ends up staying.
14tion
(1 p)(MM S)
S+(1 p)( S). The third term equals the product of average human capital for individuals who plan to
migrate and remain abroad but end up not migrating, 1
2
 
hMM( ) + hMM(MM)





The average human capital of the old generation in the Home country can be calculated in a similar way.
The only dierence is that all the individuals who migrated and whose ability was between S and MM, are


















hMM( ) + hMM(MM)

(1   p)(    MM):
MM + (1   p)(    MM)
The interpretation of the three terms on the right hand side of (21) is the same as in (20). In fact, the only
dierence in the calculation of the shares is that in the old generation all workers in the [S;MM] interval are
at Home (since those who migrated have returned) and the total size of the old population at home is equal to
MM+(1 p)(  MM)
  :
If we substitute the expressions for hS; hMR and hMM from (15) into (20) and (21), we obtain the
expressions (32) and (33) reported in Appendix B, linking the average human capital of the young and of
the old to the parameters and to the threshold values S and MM: In steady state, when parameter values
and immigration policies are stable, one can calculate the average human capital for the whole population
by combining in expression (18) the average human capital of young and old from (32) and (33), accounting
for the fact that the share of individuals who are in the Home country from the rst generation, (1   m1),
is equal to
S+(1 p)(  s)
  and the share of individuals at Home from the second generation, (1   m2); is
S+(MM S)+(1 p)(  MM)
  :
Finally, to evaluate average wages in the Home economy, which provide a simple measure of income per capita
since labor is the only factor of production in the model, we can easily combine the average wage of workers
in each of the three groups (between 0 and S , between S and MM and between MM and  ) weighted by
the share of that group among young/old workers (if we are calculating the average wage for a cohort) or in
the total population (if we are calculating the average wage overall). Let us dene wL1, wM1 and wH1 as the
average wage of workers with, respectively, low abilities (below S), medium abilities (between S and MM)
and high abilities (above MM) when they are young and wL2 , wM2 and wH2 as their average wage when they
are old. While the average wage and the size of the rst and third groups are the same when young or old,
the average wage and the size of the second group (migrants who return) is dierent and we have to keep track
of the fact that only a fraction (1   p) is in the Home country when young, whereas the entire group is in the
15country when old. To avoid redundant notation we let wL1 = wL2 = wL and wH1 = wH2 = wH such that the
average wage for the young generation w1, the average wage for the old generation w2; and the average wage
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(1   p)(    MM)
S + (MM   S) + (1   p)(    MM)

w =
1(1   m1)w1 + 2(1   m2)w2:
1(1   m1) + 2(1   m2)
(24)
where 1 and 2 are the pre-migration populations of the currently young and old cohorts and (1   m1)
and (1   m2) are the shares of those cohorts in the Home country, which dier by the fraction of workers who
return. Using the production function and expressions (2) and (5) to calculate individual wages (for those who





























































Notice that the dierence between wM1 and wM2 is the return of the share p of workers who were abroad
16and who are now endowed with the extra productivity term  in their human capital. Due to the exponential
dependence of wages on schooling and, in turn, abilities, it is easy to solve the integrals above. Expressions (34)-
(37) in Appendix B provide the analytical solutions to (25)-(29). In the next section we discuss and simulate
in detail the response of human capital and wages to dierent migration policies, emphasizing the dierential
impact depending on ability, the role of migration costs and the relevance of migrants' return.
4 Simulation of Migration Policies
The model presented above is clearly stylized. The advantage of it, however, is that most of the variables analyzed
within it have a measurable empirical counterpart. We can thus impose some structure on its predictions by
parameterizing it with the use of existing estimates and the matching of some features of the data. We can then
simulate the model to provide some insight into the eects of migration policies on human capital and wages
in the sending country. Our parameter choices are reective of Eastern and Western Europe, as Home and
Foreign countries, respectively. Immigration policies can be seen to be progressively increasing the probability
of migration p from 0 (a value appropriate for the late eighties when the Iron Curtain was preventing most
movement between East and West) to the current rates of 10-15% of the population. Moreover, envisioning the
admission of Eastern Europe into the EU (and the termination of the transitory clauses for a free movement
of persons within the EU) we can analyze the impact of an even higher probability (freer mobility of labor) of
migration from East to West. Our model allows us to identify the eects of such policy changes on schooling and
wages in Eastern Europe. Even more importantly, and novel to this model, the adopted framework allows us to
decompose the total eect on average human capital into the "pure drain from migration", the "incentive eect
from migration" and the eect stemming from "incentives from migration and return". The genuine insight
of the model is that for plausible parameter values, the incentive and the return channels produce important
dierences on human capital and wages, relative to what is predicted by the pure human capital "drain" eect of
migration. Schooling incentives and the importance of temporary migration are crucial issues when evaluating
the eect of international migration on human capital and wages in the sending country. We will also discuss
the importance of the "return premium" in determining the size and the selectivity of return migrants and we
will discuss the possibility of using it as a migration policy instrument, as countries may, for example, institute
tax-exemption policies that favor the highly skilled returnees and encourage their return. Let us rst describe
the parameter choice for the base case and for plausible variations and then, in turn, we will discuss the eects
of increased international migration and the role of return migration in determining the average human capital
in the sending country.
174.1 Parameter Choice
Table 1 shows the choice of parameters that we use in our baseline simulation. They are in part obtained from
the literature and in part chosen to match observed migration and return ows between Eastern and Western
Europe. The ratio of labor productivity abroad and at home, AF /AH, is set equal to 2. This captures the
relative labor productivity between the average Eastern European country and Germany-UK (as representative
of the West) measured in the late eighties and reported in Hall and Jones (1999)13. This assumption implies that
the dierence in logarithmic productivity ln(AF) - ln(AH), which is the term entering all the relevant expressions
in section 3, is equal to ln(2): We further take as returns to one year of schooling the values H = 0:04 and
F = 0:08 for the Home and the Foreign country, respectively. These values are based on average returns to
schooling in Poland and East Germany (for the East) and in Western Germany and the UK (for the West),
both taken around the early nineties, when the Iron Curtain collapsed, and available at Hendricks (2004). The
parameter  is chosen so that a plausible share of workers would return. As we documented in section 2 above,
return rates of 20-30% for migrants from Eastern Europe to the UK/Western Europe seem quite plausible. Hence
 is chosen so as to deliver return migration rates between 0.2 and 0.3 at current migration rates; this turns out
to be around 0.5. The pre-migration sizes of the cohorts of young and old workers (1 and 2) are both set equal
to 0.5 (so that total population is standardized to 1). This captures the essential stagnation of the population of
Eastern Europe for the last two decades (with possibly a slight decline). We experiment with a range of utility
costs of residing abroad in the rst and second period of life, M1 and M2. They, however, are always chosen so as
to match the following two restrictions. First, M1+ M2
1+ > [ln(AF) ln(AH)]2+
1+ so that the present discounted
utility cost for the least skilled worker is higher than the present discounted benet from migrating. This implies
that for the least skilled worker it is too costly to migrate, and therefore not everybody would migrate even in
the absence of legal restrictions to migration. Second, M2+ > ln(AF) ln(AH) such that some emigrants will
always return in the second period. As stated above, the percentage of migrants who return within ten years
is always non-negligible in the data, and this is a feature that we would like our model to mirror. The chosen
values and restrictions above imply that in all the considered cases the threshold hS is strictly larger than 0 and
the threshold hMM is strictly larger than hS. Hence, in all cases we have some temporary and some permanent
migrants. The variable h is literally interpreted as years of schooling, while individual ability  (which clearly
does not have a natural scale) is standardized to vary between a lower bound =0 and an upper bound  





1+, is equal to college education (16
years). Moreover, this standardization, combined with the uniform distribution assumption, implies that the
average years of schooling in autarky is equal to 8. This is a very good approximation for the Eastern European
economies around the 1985-1990 period. The Barro and Lee (2000) dataset, in fact, puts the average schooling
13Iranzo and Peri (2009) also use this value in their simulations of the impact of bilateral trade and migration on the productivity
of Eastern and Western Europe after 1989.
18in transitional economies in Eastern Europe at 8.5, with Poland at the low end of the spectrum with an average
of 6.8 in 1990 and East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia at the high end with average schooling between
8.7 and 10.1 years. The parameter  is chosen to be equal to 0:5 which implies a yearly discount rate of 2% and
a length of one period (half a working life in the model) of 20 years.
4.2 Baseline Case
Table 2 shows the eect on average schooling and wages of progressively looser migration policies, captured
by progressively higher probabilities (from left to right) of emigration. The parameter p; which captures the
probability of migrating (conditional on applying for migration), ranges from 0 to 0.3. This covers most of
the empirically relevant range as, except for some very small Caribbean islands and a few African countries,
no economy has emigration rates larger than 30%. The simulations reported in Table 2 represent our baseline
case. In these simulations we use a utility cost of living abroad equal to 1:5 times the productivity dierential
(1:5  ln(2)) between the rich and poor country and a cost of remaining abroad in the second period equal
to 0:67 (two thirds) of the logarithmic wage dierential. While it is hard to pinpoint the empirical value
of migration costs (we show results for dierent values in Tables 3 and 4) migration costs should represent
substantial costs, especially for less educated workers and should be substantially smaller in the second period
when migrants have adjusted to the new country. We choose the parameter  to be 0.5 in order to produce
plausible return migration rates of 20-30%. Under zero probability of migration (closed borders and p = 0)
the young generation (rst row), the old generation (second row) and the overall population (third row) have
8 years of average schooling (primary completed). Each of the rst three rows reports the level of h1(average
schooling of young) h2 (average schooling of old) and h as the probability of migration p increases. Recall that
eight years of schooling corresponds roughly to the average schooling for Eastern Europe in the nineties. In
the following three rows we report the average wages for the young cohort (w1), the old cohort (w2) and the
population overall (w). In order to identify the winners and losers from freer migration policies we also report,
in the following three rows, the average wage of each of the four relevant skill groups characterized by dierent
education levels and migration behavior. Workers with ability below S (low) who do not pursue migration
earn wage wL (both while young and old), as dened in equation (25). Those with ability between S and MM
(medium) who pursue migration and return earn wage wM1; dened by condition (26) when young (if they stay
at home), while they earn an average of wM2 as dened by expression (28) when old (including returnees and
those who stayed at home). Finally, those with ability above MM (high) who pursue permanent migration
earn an average wage equal to wH (given by expression (29)) both while young and old (if they end up not
migrating). Since we report wages relative to the average wage for p = 0 (which is standardized to one), it is
easy to calculate from the reported numbers the percentage variation in wages as the probabilities of migration
19change, as well as the relative wages across groups. Finally, the last two rows report the percentage of the total
population living abroad, namely the "emigration rate" under a denition comparable to that of Docquier and
Marfouk (2006). These rows also report the return rate { i.e. the percentage of total migrants who return.
The baseline case implies that workers with less than 2.88 years of schooling (hs = 2:88) will not pursue
migration, those with schooling between 2:88 years and 6:72 years will pursue migration and return, while those
with more than 6:72 years will pursue permanent migration (these values are reported in the footnote to Table
2). The overall long-run eect of a higher migration probability on average education is strictly positive in
the chosen range. Average education increases by 1:5 years going from no international mobility to signicant
mobility, p = 0:3. This increase is an average of the increase of 1.6 years of schooling for the young generation,
due to the incentive eect generated by the possibility of migration, and the increase of 1:3 years for the old
generation, as the average schooling of a returnee is slightly below the average schooling of the remaining
workers. Even at p = 0:15, a moderate level of international mobility, the average education gain relative
to autarky is equal to 0:8 years. Such improvements in average schooling produce an increase in the average
wage (income per worker) of 4% relative to autarky in the case where p = 0:15; and of 8% in the case when
p = 0:30. At a probability of migrating equal to 0:15 the young generation has an average wage that is larger
by 4% relative to autarky simply due to the incentives to acquire higher education. The older generation, which
includes the returnees who have slightly lower average schooling than natives who remained at home but earn
a "return premium" () , also receives an average wage 4% higher than in autarky. Obviously, these gains do
not include the wage gains of permanent migrants. The emigration rates (last row) observed in this scenario
for p = 0:15 are equal to 12.4%. This is well within the range observed for Eastern European countries around
the year 2000. The important result emerging from Table 2 is that the combination of incentives and return
migration, for plausible values of returns to schooling and return rates, produces sizeable positive eects on
average home-country education (and wages) in steady state. In the considered range of migration probability
(0 to 0.3) the incentive-plus-return eects more than oset the drain eect from selective migration. Figure 3a
shows the behavior of average human capital for the young generation, the old generation and their aggregate
as p varies between 0 and 1. We see that the eect of p on the human capital of the rst generation is hump
shaped, becoming negative for high values of p (because higher levels of schooling are coupled with emigration
of some of the most highly educated). The net human capital (average schooling) of the second generation is
always smaller than that of the rst generation. This is because returnees, negatively selected among migrants,
are less skilled on average than the population that stays at home. In the plausible range, however, for a value
of p between 0 and 0.3, both generations, young and old, experience increasing levels of average schooling as p
increases (as shown in Table 2).
Rows seven to ten of Table 2 report the wages of dierent groups of workers with low, intermediate and
20high education under dierent migration regimes. The intermediate group is split between young individuals,
inclusive only of those who did not migrate, and old individuals, inclusive of stayers plus the returnees. Recall
that the returnees have the extra wage premium due to their experience abroad hence they earn more than
those with intermediate education who did not migrate. Looking at each group we see that the average wage
(and schooling) of the group with lowest ability does not change much as p increases{ in fact it declines a bit.
Migration incentives do not generate any change in education per unit of ability for this group and selection
produces lower average schooling (because the threshold S decreases as p rises). The average wage of the
intermediate group when young also does not change much with p. This, however, is the result of two opposite
eects. Higher p increases the schooling of each ability type, but it also produces a selection of individuals with
progressively lower abilities in the range of potential migrants (S and MM decrease). The average wage of the
intermediate group when old is larger and increases with p because of the return premium . Finally, the group
with highest education experiences the largest increase in wages (and schooling) as p increases because workers
choose more schooling per unit of ability (eect on wH). Both the increase in average schooling (and wages) of
the group with ability above MM and the increase in the size of this group relative to the others produce the
positive eect on average schooling and wages as p increases.
4.2.1 The Role of Incentives and Return Migration
The positive eect of increasing migration probability on average human capital and wages illustrated in Table
2 (and Figure 3a) results from the fact that the education incentives plus the wage premium for returnees
reverse the loss of human capital due to skilled migration. Here we are interested in understanding: i) how
large the decrease in average human capital would be, if the two positive channels were not operating, and
ii) what the eect would be if no return migration was considered. To answer these questions we examine
two alternative scenarios. Table 3 and Figure 3b show the simulated values of schooling and wages as the
probability of migrating increases, when we eliminate the return channel (by setting  = 0 so that there is no
return premium and therefore no return). Since we only allow for permanent migration, the education incentive
eect is stronger. However, this is also a less plausible scenario as we have shown that between 20 and 30% of
emigrants return. Next, Table 4 and Figure 3c show the schooling and wage levels in the case of no incentive
eects of permanent or temporary migration (as we impose a xed correspondence between ability and the
schooling level, which is unaected by the probability of migration) and no return migration. Panel B of Tables
3 and 4 reports the dierence of each variable from the baseline case with migration and return.
From the comparison of these two cases with the baseline, two facts become apparent. First, the presence
of temporary migration modies the eects of permanent migration only slightly. In particular, since return
migration is especially benecial at intermediate ability levels and induces workers to pursue more schooling
21than stayers (but less than permanent migrants), the possibility of returning attenuates the positive incentive
eects of migration a little. However, the case with return migration looks quite similar to the case with only
permanent migration (Table 3 and Figure 3b): for plausible values of p (around 0.2) the possibility of return
reduces the positive eect on human capital by only about a fth of one year of schooling, and wages are even
closer to the baseline (1% dierence) as the temporary migrant, while having lower schooling than the average
earns a premium that partly makes up for that. In contrast, the case with no incentives and only permanent
migration (Table 4 and Figure 3c) looks very dierent. In that case, selective migration (returns to schooling are
still higher abroad) only produces a drain of highly educated individuals, and for plausible values of migration
probability (p = 0:2) the pure brain drain eect reduces average schooling by 1:3 years and average wages
by 7% relative to no migration. The percentage of emigrants under each scenario is the same. What changes
signicantly is the education of those who do not migrate (incentive eect) and the percentage of those returning
(return is ruled out as in the case of Table 3).
The interesting quantitative insight of the exercise is that the incentive eects of both temporary and
permanent migration are strong enough to produce positive human capital and wage eects in the Home country
for the parameter combination used in the baseline case and for reasonable values of p. This is interesting news
since the positive incentive eect is at times considered simply as a theoretical curiosum, whereas it seems
quite plausible in our model for reasonable parameter values. Inspection of Figures 3a and 3b also reveals that
there is a level of p above which the "brain drain" eect becomes stronger than the incentive plus return eect
such that the average schooling and average wage of the remaining workers decrease with p. For our chosen
parameter conguration, however, this only happens at very high levels of p (above 0.6), which represents a
degree of free mobility that is far from that which currently exists. In the relevant range, the incentive eect on
the schooling and wages of the remaining workers is clearly positive, even when augmented for the possibility
of temporary migration. As long as this exercise is illustrative of the potential eect of relaxing immigration
policies in Western Europe, we can say that Eastern Europe would even benet, in net terms, from a doubling
of the ow of migrants to the West (even if those who migrate are among the best educated and even if migrants
move only temporarily).
4.2.2 Sensitivity to Migration Costs
The costs of living abroad in the rst and second period of life are parameters that are hard to pin down. Hence
Table A1 in the Appendix shows simulations where, compared to the baseline, the migration costs in the rst
period (M1) are reduced by 20% and Table A2 in the Appendix shows the eect of increasing the costs of staying
abroad in the second period (M2) by around 20%. The impacts are relatively small and their direction is as
expected. In Table A1, lower costs of working abroad in the rst period of life (i.e. lower geographic moving
22costs, or reduced loss of skills when migrating) induce more people to emigrate, reduce the schooling threshold
for migration and create stronger incentives to get educated. The average eect, relative to the baseline case,
is to increase schooling and wages for each generation (again the extra incentive eect is larger than the extra
drain eect). In Table A2, the higher cost of staying abroad in the second period induces higher return rates
and smaller emigration rates (relative to the baseline). The resulting increase in temporary migrants, whose
average schooling is lower than that of potential permanent migrants, produces a smaller positive schooling
eect (relative to the baseline case) and smaller positive wages for both young and old.
4.3 Extensions
As we have emphasized in section 4.2 above, the presence of a signicant share of return migrants does not alter
substantially, but attenuates a bit, the incentive eects of migration on education. There is one case, however,
in which the possibility of return migration strengthens the positive human capital eects of migration, and
that is when the return premium increases with the schooling of migrants. In this case the returnees are the
most highly educated among the migrants. A second interesting extension is to allow for the immigration policy
in the receiving country to distinguish between high and low skilled and to accept less skilled migrants only
temporarily and with lower probability. The implications of these two extensions are analyzed next.
4.3.1 Skill-Dependent Return Premium
A very important parameter in determining the gains from and the incentives for return immigration is , the
wage premium upon return to the Home country. In the basic model (equation 5) this premium is independent
of the schooling of the migrant, while the premium to stay abroad increases with the schooling level of the
migrants (since it depends on (F   H)hi ). Hence, among migrants, only those with little schooling would
rather receive this premium than stay abroad. The empirical literature, however, is unclear about the specic
form of the return premium. Some studies (mentioned in section 2) suggest that such a premium could be
larger in percentage terms for more skilled (educated) workers. Moreover, if we think of policy measures to
encourage the return of educated migrants, a tax relief that would make taxes less progressive for returnees
would look like a premium which increases proportionately with the level of education. In this extension, we
analyze the eect of assuming a return premium proportional to schooling. That is, the wage of a returnee
would be ln(w2
FHi) = ln(AH)+Hhi +hi with H + > F so that there is a positive percentage of returnees.
In this case, returnees are positively selected among emigrants (who continue to be positively selected among
the total source country population) and, as a consequence, they have the highest human capital and contribute
positively to average schooling and wages of the country of origin upon return.14
14In Appendix C, we show the details of the model modied to incorporate a return premium that is increasing in schooling.
23In Table 5 we show the average human capital and wages overall as well as separately for the three groups
of workers as the probability of migrating p varies between 0 and 0.3. We choose  = 2:4 to match a return-
migration rate around 20 to 30%. As in the baseline, workers with less than 3 years of schooling (hs = 2:88)
will not pursue migration. Now, however, those with schooling between 2:88 years and 14:44 years pursue
permanent migration while those with more than 14:44 years will pursue migration and, if they are able to leave
the country when young, they will return to the home country when old (values are reported in the footnote
to Table 5). The threshold hRM now denotes the schooling level above which migrants choose to return after
one period of working life spent abroad. This schooling threshold corresponds to the ability threshold RM as
dened in Appendix C. If a country rewards the human capital accumulated abroad with a return premium
that is increasing in schooling (hi), it may generate an important, positive eect on migrants' schooling, wages
and decision to return.
Simulations in Table 5 show that such a premium produces, already for p = 0:15, average schooling of 9.2
years (plus 0.3 years relative to the baseline) and an average wage of 1.09 (plus 5% relative to the baseline case).
Overall, the average schooling of the population in the sending country increases by 2:5 years going from no
international mobility to signicant mobility, p = 0:3, while the average wage increases by almost 30%. The
additional positive eect generated in this scenario is mainly due to a positive net eect on the schooling of
the highest skilled, who now return. However, there is also an increased eect on average human capital and
schooling of the young, as the education incentive eect is greater now than before (compare (15) and (45)).
The share of returnees among emigrants is now increasing in p (instead of decreasing, as in the baseline): with
an increase in the likelihood of migration, the threshold for return migration RM decreases and it becomes
protable for a larger share of the population to get the highest level of education and, conditional on winning
the lottery, migrate and return.
Notice, importantly, that the increase in average wages is mainly driven by the very large expansion of the
group of highly educated who return and receive a high wage premium. The average wage of this group is now
dierent for the young and for the old (reported in the rows of Table 5 headed by wH1 and wH2), as the latter
include the emigrants who return. In contrast, the average wage for the medium-skilled is the same when young
and old because when they emigrate they now remain abroad.
4.3.2 Skill-dependent Migration probability
It is plausible to assume that migrants with dierent schooling face dierent probabilities of migration. Most
rich countries have immigration laws that make it easier for people with more schooling to immigrate. Therefore,
it makes sense to include in the model a variation in the probability term such that those workers with lower
schooling levels (and ability i < MM) have a probability p1 of actually migrating if they decide to apply for it,
24and those with high levels of schooling (and ability i > MM) have probability p2 of success in migrating, with
p2 > p1: This modies the optimal schooling functions for people of high skill levels who migrate permanently,
hMM
i , and for people of intermediate skill levels who migrate to return, hMR
i . The eect of such a change can
be understood by looking at Figure 1. In particular, the schedule hMM
i becomes a steeper function of  so that
the threshold MM decreases and more people (with lower abilities) choose higher education, migration and
a stay abroad, while the schedule hMR
i becomes a less steep function of  so that the threshold S increases
and fewer people (with higher abilities) choose temporary migration. Intuitively, the option of migrating and
staying abroad now becomes appealing for a greater range of abilities, because it carries a higher probability of
occurring. Conversely, fewer people will opt to migrate and return as they would rather stay at home (if their
ability is low) or migrate and stay abroad (if their ability is high). Notice that the assumption of the model
is that individuals self-sort into one of the two lotteries (for temporary or permanent migration) and that the
sorting is done optimally, in the sense that each person chooses the lottery that maximizes expected utility for
a given probability of succeeding 15. For large dierences between p2 and p1 the case of no temporary migration
can arise16.
Table 6 shows average schooling and wages for the population in the sending country in the case of dierent
migration probabilities. In particular, we maintain a dierence between p2 and p1 equal to 0.10 and we increase
p1 from 0 to 0.25. In this scenario the share of returning migrants decreases substantially while the share of
permanent migrants in the total population increases. The human capital of the rst generation is slightly
greater than in the baseline (as the incentive for the young to permanently migrate increases relative to the
baseline) but the human capital of the second generation is smaller17. Also, the human capital of the second
generation now decreases slightly as p increases, since the positive incentive eect is dominated by the return of
migrants who have a lower than average education level. The average wage of the highly educated changes the
most due to the strong increase in their education incentives, while the average wage of the low- and medium-
educated hardly change at all compared to the baseline. In general, this example illustrates that many of the
benets to average domestic schooling and wages are still present even when migration policies discriminate
between levels of education (or temporary and permanent migrants), giving higher probability of success to
highly educated prospective migrants who seek a permanent stay abroad.
15If we were to allow an individual to participate in both lotteries at the same time and choose the preferred outcome, then we
should modify the analysis slightly. The qualitative implications, however, would be the same.
16One could also use our model to analyze the case in which the probability of temporary emigration, p1; is larger than the
probability of permanent migration, p2. This may be more plausible in some cases. Here, we wanted to capture the fact that
most receiving countries have less restrictive immigration policies for highly educated immigrants, who self-select into permanent
migration in our analysis.
17We compare the variables for p in the baseline case with the average of p1 and p2 in the current case.
255 Conclusions
This paper presents a model of optimal decisions regarding schooling, migration and return and parameterizes
it in order to obtain quantitative insight into the eect of freer labor mobility between Eastern and Western
Europe on average human capital in Eastern Europe. The key qualitative and quantitative insight is that, as
Western Europe pays a higher return to skill relative to Eastern Europe, the possibility of migration induces
potential temporary and permanent migrants in the East to invest more in human capital. This investment,
plus the fact that some migrants return while other potential migrants end up staying in the East, has a
positive eect on average schooling that more than osets the negative eect of brain-drain. For productivity
dierentials and dierences in the wage premium for schooling taken from recent wage data from Eastern and
Western Europe we calculate that an increase in the probability of migration from 0 to 20% (comparable with the
changes experienced during the 1990's between Eastern and Western Europe) may add about a year to average
schooling in Eastern Europe. Moreover, while for very high levels of mobility (a probability of migration greater
than 70%) there may be a negative net eect on human capital in Eastern Europe, there still seems to be large
scope for increasing East-West mobility and average human capital in Eastern Europe.
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29A Appendix: Average Human Capital and Wages When MM < S.
In the case of MM < S, there is no temporary migration: those with ability below MM do not opt for the
lottery and stay at Home, while those with ability above migrate if they win the lottery, and then stay abroad
(Figure 2). Therefore, average human capital for the young generation is given by:
h1 = h2 =
1
2hS(MM)MM





hMM( ) + hMM(MM)

(1   p)(    MM)
MM + (1   p)(   MM)
(30)
Substituting the expressions for hS and hMM from (15) into (30) we obtain:
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B Appendix: Explicit Solutions
If we substitute the expressions for hS; hMR and hMM from (15) into (20) and (21), we obtain the following
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MM)
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As for the average wages of each group, we can calculate them for the low-, middle- and high-skilled in









































































































































C Appendix: The Case of Return Premium Increasing in Schooling
The model behind the simulations of section 4.3.1 is described in this Appendix. The wage specication after
return has a premium that increases with schooling:
ln(w2
FHi) = ln(AH) + Hhi + hi (38)





1 if hi >
ln(AF) ln(AH) M2
H+ F




31i.e. positive selection of return migrants. Note that now we need ln(AF)   ln(AH) +    M2 > 0 for
permanent migration to exist (such that some people stay abroad). Whereas in the baseline case above, we
need ln(AH)   ln(AF) + M2 > 0 for temporary migration to exist (such that some return).























The schooling thresholds for workers to choose to stay at Home (hence l
i = 0, q
i = 0) in both periods.:
hi <
M1(1 + ) + M2(1   qi)   (ln(AF)   ln(AH))(2 +    qi)
(F   H)(2 + ) + (H +    F)qi
 hS (41)
For human capital between the values:
M1(1 + ) + M2(1   qi)   (ln(AF)   ln(AH))(2 +    qi)
(F   H)(2 + ) + (H +    F)qi
< hi <
ln(AF)   ln(AH)   M2
H +    F
(42)
workers choose to enter the migration lottery and, conditional on emigrating, they stay in the destination
country (l
i = 1, q
i = 0). For values of human capital:
hi >
ln(AF)   ln(AH)   M2
H +    F
 hRM (43)
they choose to enter the lottery and, conditional on emigrating, they return (l
i = 1, q
i = 1).































(H + p(F   H))i for l
i = 1;q








(H + p(F   H)) +
1
1 + 










1+(H + p(F   H))
M1(1 + ) + M2(1   qi)   (ln(AF)   ln(AH))(2 +    qi)





1+(H + p(F   H)) + 1
1+(H +    F)
ln(AF)   ln(AH)   M2
H +    F
(47)
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